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The new century has witnessed a remarkable 
turnabout in youth justice policy in America. 
After peaking at over 100,000 youth in custody 
in 2000, youth incarceration has dropped by more 
than half and there is a growing movement among 
activists, formerly incarcerated people, youth 
correctional leaders, and prosecutors to end the 
use of youth prisons in favor of community programs 
and supports for young people who have run afoul 
of the law. For the few who require custody, states 
throughout the country have been closing large, 
distant youth prisons and, in some jurisdictions, 
replacing them with small, homelike facilities 
close to home. 
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In many respects, what has happened and 
continues to happen with youth justice is 
what many criminal justice advocates and 
community organizers have been calling for 
on behalf of incarcerated adults: the halving 
of incarceration, realignment of funding to 
community programs, widespread youth 
prison closures, and calls for complete 
deinstitutionalization. This all happened while 
youth crime has continued to plummet. And, 
this remarkable decline in youth incarceration 
started from a moment when there was 
bi-partisan vilification of young people.
This paper will discuss the remarkable and 
unexpected decline over the past two decades 
of youth incarceration. It will summarize 
research on the negative impact of youth 
imprisonment, even in its attenuated state, 
and the implications for the future of the 
19th century youth prison model as it faces 
its possible demise. The paper will also 
juxtapose youth decarceration with the adult 
criminal justice system—still squarely mired 
in mass incarceration—and offer implications 
for both juvenile and adult justice reform 
going forward.
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THE END OF THE 
SUPER-PREDATOR ERA
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On the horizon, therefore, are tens of 
thousands of severely morally impoverished 
juvenile super-predators. They are perfectly 
capable of committing the most heinous 
acts of physical violence for the most trivial 
reasons … They fear neither the stigma of arrest 
nor the pain of imprisonment. They live by the 
meanest code of the meanest streets, a code 
that reinforces rather than restrains their violent, 
hair-trigger mentality. In prison or out, the things 
that super-predators get by their criminal behavior—
sex, drugs, money—are their own immediate rewards. 
Nothing else matters to them. So far, as long as their 
youthful energies hold out, they will do what comes 
‘naturally’: murder, rape, rob, assault, burglarize, 
deal deadly drugs, and get high. 
John DiIulio, 1996
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Following sharp increases in both adult 
and youth crime, particularly homicides, 
youth justice practices came under attack 
during the 1980s and 1990s for being soft 
on crime. Policymakers from both parties 
bandied about phrases like “super-predator” 
to describe America’s youth, claiming that 
if such remorseless adolescents “do the 
adult crime, they should do the adult time” 
(Hudson 2009).1 
Researchers like Northeastern University’s 
James Allen Fox and Princeton’s John  
J. DiIulio issued wild—and, as it turned out, 
wildly inaccurate—forecasts of a “rising tide” 
of hundreds of thousands of such juvenile 
super-predators poised to unleash a “blood 
bath of teen violence” on hapless citizens 
(Bennett, DiIulio, and Walters 1996:26; 
Butterfield 1995).
Public sentiment erupted in fear. In 1998, 
despite youth violent crime rates being 
at their lowest point in the history of the 
National Crime Victimization Survey  
(up to that point in time), 62 percent of 
poll respondents felt that youth crime was 
on the rise. In 1996, the pervasive depiction 
of youth as offenders in newspapers and 
other media contributed to 60 percent of 
California survey respondents believing 
that “most crime nowadays is committed 
by young people” (Dorfman and Schiraldi 
2001:40). In reality, young people were 
responsible for only about 13 percent 
of violent crime that year (Dorfman 
and Schiraldi 2001:40).
Policy and youth incarceration responded 
in kind. During the 1990s, every state in 
the U.S. made it easier to prosecute or jail 
young people with adults or rolled back 
confidentiality protections, eroding these 
core elements of the youth justice system 
(Sickmund and Puzzanchera 2014:86). 
Advocates and pundits ruminated about 
the end of the juvenile court. University 
of Minnesota Professor Barry Feld openly 
They are often the kinds of kids that are called 
super-predators—no conscience, no empathy. 
We can talk about why they ended up that way, 
but first, we have to bring them to heel.
Hillary Clinton, 1996
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advocated the court’s demise in favor 
of “youth discounts” for youth in adult 
courts and the Coalition for Juvenile 
Justice’s annual report to Congress 
was somberly entitled “Celebration or 
Wake: The Juvenile Court after 100 Years” 
(Feld 1993:264; Coalition for Juvenile 
Justice 1998).
Youth incarceration in juvenile 
facilities exploded, reaching 108,882 
by 2000 (Sawyer 2019). During the 
early 2000s, another 250,000 young 
people were being tried as adults 
each year, with approximately 12,000 
of them sleeping in adult prisons or 
jails every night, numbers unheard 
of internationally (Ziedenberg 2011:2; 
Beck and Karberg 2001:5–6).
The racial animus behind this assault on 
the more benign youth justice system was  
thinly-veiled, or sometimes not veiled 
at all. DiIulio, once again at the forefront 
of this attack, wrote, “all that’s left of 
the black community in some pockets 
of urban America is deviant, delinquent 
and criminal adults surrounded by 
severely abused and neglected children, 
virtually all of whom were born out of 
wedlock” (Schiraldi 2001). Rather than 
being castigated for such pronouncements, 
DiIulio was rewarded with an appointment 
by President George H.W. Bush to run the 
newly-established Office of Faith Based 
Initiatives (Schiraldi 2001). Rhetoric such 
as DiIulio’s was remarkably effective at 
criminalizing communities of color. From 
1983 to 1997, 80 percent of the increase in 
detained youth were youth of color (Hinton 
Hoytt, Schiraldi, Smith, and Ziedenberg 
2002:10).
And then it stopped.
Well, it hasn’t stopped completely, 
but punitive policies aimed at juveniles 
have plummeted over the past two 
decades. From 1999 to 2017, there has 
been a 60 percent decline in the number 
of youths in juvenile custody, dropping 
from 108,802 to 43,580 (Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
2019). Every state besides West Virginia 
experienced double-digit percentage 
declines in youth incarceration during 
this time (Sickmund, Sladky, Kang, 
and Puzzanchera 2019).
As an example, California had over 
10,000 youth in state youth prisons in 
the mid-1990s. Now, it has fewer than 
800 (Schiraldi, Schindler, and Goliday 2011). 
By 2018, 39 of 43 California counties had 
youth facilities that were less than half 
full, with 7 counties at a quarter capacity 
or less, exponentially increasing the cost 
per incarcerated youth for taxpayers. 
Since 2011, the average annual cost of 
detaining a youth in 14 diverse California 
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counties increased between 29 to 
214 percent. For example, the annual cost 
of detention per child in Santa Clara County 
increased from $187,000 in 2011 to $514,000 
in 2018 (Tucker and Palomino 2019).
As the cost per youth in confinement has 
increased, the already limited utility of all 
of these facilities at the state and local level 
declines, making it harder to argue to keep 
them open. In May 2020, California Governor 
Gavin Newsom proposed eliminating the 
state’s Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ), 
once the nation’s largest youth corrections 
systems, and realigning youth incarceration 
to California counties. In doing so, he noted 
that there were fewer than 800 youth 
confined in DJJ and that county facilities 
were housing 3,600 youth in facilities with 
a capacity of 11,200 (Office of California 
Governor Gavin Newsom 2020).
From 2000 to 2017, the number of kids 
locked up in adult jails and prisons also 
dropped precipitously from 17,633 to 4,135—
a 70 percent decline from the turn of the 
century (Bureau of Justice Statistics N.d). 
Eleven states raised the age at which they 
include youth in their juvenile systems to 18 
(and one—Vermont—to 20), leaving only three 
states—Georgia, Texas and Wisconsin—still 
trying all 17-year-olds as adults. Since 2007, 
40 states and Washington, DC, have enacted 
approximately 100 pieces of legislation to 
remove youth from adult jails and prisons, 
limit the prosecution of youth in adult court, 
or revise sentencing laws (Mistrett 2020).
Far from engendering the predicted 
bloodbath, the opposite trend accompanied 
this less punitive approach—youth crime 
plummeted alongside the decline in youth 
punishment, giving the lie to cherished 
beliefs that youth imprisonment was 
necessary to ensure safety. The juvenile 
arrest rate declined 60 percent from 
2000 to 2017 while large drops in youth 
incarceration were occurring (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation 2000:226; Federal 
Bureau of Investigation 2017b; United States 
Census Bureau 2002; United States Census 
Bureau 2020).
No one could have predicted this reversal 
of fortune for the youth imprisonment 
zealots during their mid-1990s’ heyday.
The decline in youth crime and incarceration 
has been so sharp that both the number 
of total facilities in operation and the 
percent capacity at which remaining 
facilities are currently operating have 
decreased dramatically. From 2002 to 2012, 
970—one in three—youth facilities closed 
up shop. Moreover, the overwhelming 
majority of large youth correctional facilities 
(66 percent of facilities with a capacity 
of more than 200) have shuttered since 
their peak in 1999. From 1997 to 2017, 
there has been an 87 percent decline 
in the number of youths held in facilities 
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of more than 200 people (Sickmund et al. 
2019). In some cases, money saved from 
these closures and decreases in operating 
costs has followed the kids from their 
prisons into their home neighborhoods 
to provide services meant to help get them 
back on the straight and narrow (Schiraldi 
et al. 2011).
As Figure 1 illustrates, adult and youth 
crime and incarceration rates have taken 
dramatically different paths since 2000, 
the year when youth incarceration peaked. 
As noted above, from then until 2017, the 
youth crime rate declined by 60 percent 
while the youth incarceration rate also 
dropped by 60 percent.2 Meanwhile, from 
2000 to 2017, adult crime rates declined 
by 16 percent, but adult incarceration rates 
actually increased by 15 percent.
Criminal justice reform organizations such 
as JustLeadershipUSA, the American Civil 
Liberties Union, and #CUT50 have called 
for a 50 percent reduction in imprisonment. 
But adult incarceration has declined at 
a tepid pace, not even keeping up with the 
decline in crime (Gramlich 2019; Kaeble 
and Cowhig 2018:1).3 Research in 2018 by 
the Sentencing Project estimated that, 
at the current rate at which incarceration 
is declining, it would take 75 years to cut 
America’s adult prison population in half 
(Mauer 2018). In many respects, these youth 
decarceration outcomes are the precise 
goals of adult decarceration advocates 
and should be examined to glean lessons 
for their potential to contribute to the 
end of mass incarceration.4 
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Note: Number of arrests of persons under 18 was 
divided by total population count of persons ages 
5–17 (with the same process repeated for persons 
18 and over) to create a proxy for crime rates. 
Adult correctional populations were obtained 
through the summation of state and federal 
prison populations and local jail populations 
(excluding juvenile prison and jail populations) 
from BJS Correctional Reports. 4
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IN A POST-COVID-19 WORLD
Having the world’s highest youth incarceration 
rate was not particularly good public policy, even 
before the COVID-19 pandemic swept across 
the globe (McCarthy, Schiraldi, and Shark, 2015). 
As this paper will demonstrate, youth prisons 
are brutal, costly, ineffective, and meted out 
in a racially inequitable manne r. 
But since the advent of the coronavirus crisis, 
imprisoning youth is even more indefensible. 
Incarcerated young people are at heightened 
risk for the virus compared to their peers (Aalsma, 
Anderson, Schwartz, Ouyang, Tu, Rosenman, 
and Wiehe 2017). System-involved youth generally 
have poorer health than their agemates, including 
higher rates of asthma, which increases the 
severity of COVID-19 (Sawyer 2019; Winkelman, 
Frank, Binswanger and Pinals 2017; Wetsman 2018). 
Furthermore, although young people typically 
suffer from less severe symptoms than their 
elders, it is wrong to presume that being young 
makes one invulnerable. Recently, 17-year-old 
boys who had tested positive for COVID-19 have 
died in both Los Angeles and New Orleans (Froelich 
2020; O’Connell 2020). Nationally, as of May 8, 2020, 
421 staff and 251 youth have tested positive for 
COVID-19 in youth correctional facilities. On April 1, 
a staff member who once worked for me in DC’s 
Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services—
Kenneth J. Moore—died from a COVID-19 infection.
Youth prisons are ripe for the spread of infection, 
with limited access to hand washing and poor 
ventilation. Youth prisons often promote group 
activities and are designed around shared 
bathrooms, eating areas and, often, sleeping 
areas. Separating youth from one another can 
sometimes morph into solitary confinement, which 
is extremely damaging to adolescent mental health. 
Add the rotation of staff in three shifts a day to 
a group of medically vulnerable young people 
compelled to congregate, and you have a recipe 
for disaster. In many respects, if one were designing 
an environment in which to spread the virus—both 
in and out—one could hardly do better than youth 
correctional facilities.
As staff or their family members become sick, they 
will start missing work, thinning already stretched 
staffing complements. Others will refuse to come 
to work out of fear of contracting the virus, a concern 
growing more warranted by the day, as youth 
correctional staff in New York City and Washington, 
DC have died of COVID-19 (Grench 2020).
During a time of heightened stress, youth will find 
themselves incarcerated in facilities improperly 
staffed to do positive programming like school, 
group therapy, or recreation. Visits by volunteers—
essential to facility activities—and families, are 
being suspended. The longer this pandemic goes 
on, the clearer it will become to youth that we have 
abandoned them.
For all these reasons, 32 current and former youth 
correctional leaders recommended releasing 
youth from correctional facilities who can safely 
be sent home because “locked settings were an 
unsuccessful model for addressing youth crime even 
before the pandemic, and are dangerous at this time, 
with youth facilities placing staff and youth at risk 
because of these facilities’ size, age, and condition,” 
(Youth Correctional Leaders for Justice 2020). 
The very same day—March 19, 2020—advocates and 
community organizers from 36 states sent letters 
to their Governors, juvenile justice administrators 
and other state and local officials demanding a halt 
to new admissions to youth prisons, release of 
any medically vulnerable youth from correctional 
facilities, and an elimination of youth incarceration 
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unless the youth was determined to be a “substantial 
safety risk to others” (Youth First Initiative 2020).
As tragic as it is, the pandemic provides us with 
an opportunity to jump-start some of the reforms 
we should have been engaged in prior to this crisis. 
Youth justice systems have begun to step up, 
perhaps buoyed by the fact that youth correctional 
populations have been declining without negatively 
affecting crime for the past two decades. A survey 
of juvenile justice agencies in 30 states funded 
by the Annie E. Casey Foundation found that the 
number of young people in local secure detention 
centers fell by 32 percent in March and April 2020 
(The Annie E. Casey Foundation 2020a).
Milwaukee, Wisconsin provides an informative 
case study of a jurisdiction that was already reducing 
its incarcerated youth population and that is now 
endeavoring to comprehensively do so in the wake 
of the pandemic. In 2017, when I was the expert 
witness on the lawsuit against Wisconsin’s two youth 
prisons—Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake (discussed 
at length later in this paper) —Milwaukee County 
incarcerated 64 youth who were not classified as 
“Serious Juvenile Offenders” (SJO) in Lincoln Hills 
and Copper Lake. By January 2020, that number 
had declined to 33 youth. Encouraged by these 
declines, Milwaukee County youth justice leaders 
and advocates were discussing ways that Milwaukee 
could completely stop using Wisconsin’s notorious 
youth prisons even before the current crisis.
After the pandemic hit, the need to remove young 
people from youth prisons became even more 
apparent. The Milwaukee County Division of Youth 
and Family Services has now proposed the creation 
of a Zero Youth Corrections Project Manager to 
cease using Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake for 
Milwaukee’s youth altogether.5 Among other things, 
this position would be responsible for capturing and 
reallocating funds saved by eliminating the use of 
state youth prisons. For each youth diverted from 
state custody, Milwaukee County saves the $200,750 
a year that it would need to pay the state for that 
youth’s incarceration. The costs to taxpayers will 
continue to increase in years to come, as the cost 
to Wisconsin counties per youth, per year in state 
custody will rise to $224,475 on January 1, 2021 
(Pechacek 2019).
Further, the Zero Youth Corrections manager 
would launch a participatory budgeting process 
with Milwaukee communities to co-design the 
services, supports, and opportunities that would 
become available as these funds were reallocated 
locally, and would oversee recruitment of credible 
messengers along with efforts to identify “at least 
one durable, positive, pro-social adult relationship 
for every youth” in the system.
To reduce the population of youth (and adults) 
detained and committed and to assure that youth 
in custody are humanely cared for, Milwaukee’s 
Chief Judge Mary Triggiano is meeting with 
Milwaukee stakeholders and public health officials 
twice weekly. Youth with misdemeanor capiases 
(warrants) who come into contact with law 
enforcement are not being detained during this 
pandemic. A policy has been put into place to clear 
the capias and provide a new court date without 
having the youth brought into custody. Other 
health measures have been undertaken to reduce 
inadvertent infection and on-line programming 
and visitation have been initiated.
As Circuit Court Judge Laura A. Crivello, who 
presides over Milwaukee’s juvenile court, stated: 
“Potentially, this pandemic may teach us new ways 
to look at things and how to address matters. 
It definitely has us thinking outside the box. 
Time will tell what good arises out of all of this.” 6
Neither staff nor youth in Milwaukee’s youth justice 
system have tested positive for COVID-19 as of the 
writing of this paper. By April 2020, there were only 
29 non-SJO youth from Milwaukee County in state 
custody. The County’s detention population has 
also declined by 14 percent versus its pre-COVID-19 
average daily population.7
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The failure of youth incarceration to advance 
public safety should not come as a surprise. 
In 2013, summarizing the research on 
youth prisons, the National Research 
Council recommended against 
institutionalization and offered suggestions 
of what court-involved youth need to thrive 
(National Research Council 2013). These 
suggestions included:
1 Limiting and structuring contact 
with antisocial peers and encouraging 
contact with prosocial peers.
2 Keeping youth proximate to their 
communities, which is less disruptive 
of their developmental progress.
3 Involving parents and ensuring 
family engagement.
4 Providing a social context that has 
ample opportunity and structures 
for healthy development and that 
provides youth with the tools to deal 
with negative influences that might 
be present in the settings they will 
encounter in the future.
5 Offering opportunities for academic 
success and activities that contribute 
to developing decision-making and 
critical thinking skills.
This is neither currently nor historically 
what kids get when they are incarcerated 
in the U.S.
In 1973, the National Advisory Commission 
on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals 
concluded that the nation’s youth institutions 
“have a dismal record of failure… and should 
be closed” (National Advisory Commission 
on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals 
1973). In 1994, the federal Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
conducted a study of 995 youth prisons, 
concluding that there were “substantial and 
widespread” problems with living space, 
health care, security, and suicide prevention 
with deficiencies in all but a few of the 
facilities it examined (Parent, Leiter, 
Kennedy, Livens, Wentworth, and 
Wilcox 1994:1).
Too often, such facilities are located 
hours from youths’ home communities 
and devoid of structured programming. 
They are frequently brutal congregate 
care environments in which youth are 
huddled in idleness with many others 
who have broken the law in a stressful 
and sometimes violent tug of war with 
the only adults with whom they come 
into contact—correctional officers.
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Not surprisingly, the outcomes from these 
youth prisons are dismal. While there is 
no agreed-upon measure of recidivism 
across jurisdictions, state data reveal 
that 70 to 80 percent of youth returning 
to the community from incarceration 
are re-arrested within two to three 
years (Mendel 2011:10).
Researchers Aizer and Doyle analyzed 
the outcomes of 35,000 court-involved 
youth over 10 years. Using the “natural 
experiment” of the random assignment 
of judges allowed the researchers to 
examine youth who were similar in terms 
of prior record, current offense, family 
background, etc. They found that rather 
than accruing human and social capital like 
their non-incarcerated peers, incarcerated 
youth were accruing “criminal capital.” This 
significantly worsened their rates of adult 
offending and diminished their academic 
achievement, including the likelihood 
that they would ever return to school  
post-release (Aizer and Doyle 2015).
In other words, they found that the 
youth justice system failed at its two 
basic goals of reducing the odds of 
youth reoffending and setting them 
on a path to successful adulthood. 
YOUTH PRISONS ARE BRUTAL, COSTLY, 
INEFFECTIVE, AND METED OUT 
IN A RACIALLY INEQUITABLE MANNER. 
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STARK AND RISING 
RACIAL DISPARITIES
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As with the adult criminal justice system, 
racial disparities in youth incarceration 
are dramatic. But unlike disparities in adult 
imprisonment, which have declined slightly 
of late, disparities in youth imprisonment are 
on the rise even as youth incarceration rates 
decline (Sickmund et al. 2019). 
In 2017, Black and Native youth were 
incarcerated at 5.8 and 2.5 times the 
rate of white youth (Sickmund et al. 2019; 
Puzzanchera, Sladky, and Wang 2019). 
In 2015, Latino youth were 1.7 times more 
likely to be incarcerated than white youth 
(The Sentencing Project 2017).8
In 2002, researchers conducted a meta-
analysis of the studies on disproportionate 
minority confinement of youth. Twenty-five 
of the 34 studies (73 percent) they reviewed 
showed “race effects”—disparities not 
explainable by current offense or prior 
record—in the handling of youth at one 
or more stages of legal processing 
(Pope, Lovell, and Hsia 2002:5).
Furthermore, a report issued by the National 
Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) 
showed how these disparities compounded, 
resulting in a “cumulative disadvantage” for 
youth of color as they moved through the 
system (Hartney and Silva 2007:1). NCCD 
found that, from 2002 to 2004, although 
Black Americans made up just 16 percent 
of American youth under 18, they constituted 
28 percent of juvenile arrests, 37 percent of 
youth in detention, and 58 percent of youth 
admitted to adult prisons (See Figure 2) 
(Hartney and Silva 2007:1–3).
Researchers Bridges and Steen (1998) 
offered a rare glimpse into how bias can 
affect youth before the law. They analyzed 
presentence reports of youth being assessed 
by probation officers in a large northwestern 
county. They found that the probation 
officers there were more likely to see the 
crimes of youth of color as caused by internal 
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forces (e.g., personal failure, inadequate 
moral character, personality) while crimes 
by white youth were seen as caused by 
external forces (e.g., poor home life, lack 
of appropriate role models, environment). 
Controlling for current offense and relevant 
background information, youth of color were 
described as higher risk and were more likely 
to be recommended for incarceration than 
white youth.
For example, comparing two boys of 
different races accused of separate  
first-offense robberies, probation 
officers wrote:
This robbery was very dangerous as 
Ed confronted the victim with a loaded 
shotgun. He pointed it at the victim 
and demanded money be placed in 
a paper bag… There is an adult quality 
to this referral. In talking with Ed, 
what was evident was the relaxed and 
open way he discussed his lifestyle. 
There didn’t seem to be any desire to 
change. There was no expression of 
remorse from the young man. There 
was no moral content to his comment.
About Ed, a Black youth, who robbed 
a gas station with two friends.
Lou is the victim of a broken 
home. He is trying to be his own 
man, but… is seemingly easily 
misled and follows other delinquents 
against his better judgment. Lou 
is a tall emaciated little boy who is 
terrified by his present predicament. 
It appears that he is in need of drug/
alcohol evaluation and treatment.
About Lou, a white youth, who 
robbed two motels at gunpoint  
(Bridges and Steen 1998:564).
These disparities can accumulate to 
completely eliminate incarceration for 
white youth as incarcerated populations 
decline. In fiscal year 2017, only Black and 
Latino youth were committed to Limited 
Secure (locked) facilities in New York 
City (Weissman, Ananthakrishnan, and 
Schiraldi 2019:38). During the five years 
I ran Washington, DC’s DYRS, I did not 
have a single white kid committed.
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THE YOUTH SYSTEM 
AND ENDEMIC ABUSE
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Throughout my four decades in this field, 
I have worked within and outside the youth 
justice system and have seen firsthand how 
systems intended to protect and support 
youth have instead engaged in widespread 
abuse and inhumane treatment of the young 
people in their care. 
When I became director of DYRS in 2005, 
the conditions under which the kids 
were incarcerated in our nation’s capital 
were shocking. Staff routinely beat the 
youth, occasionally stripping them naked 
and tossing them into their cells for lengthy 
periods. Sometimes youth were locked down 
for so long without release that they urinated 
or defecated in their cells. The young people 
reported taking their shirts off at night to 
stuff them into cracks in the walls to prevent 
rats and cockroaches from crawling on them 
while they slept. Drugs were so pervasive 
in the facility (being sold, we learned, by 
a corrections officer) that youth who came 
into custody testing drug-free had marijuana 
in their systems when they were retested 
a month later.
Sexual abuse was rampant. I met a new 
educational aide who was incarcerated 
at our youth prison—the Oak Hill Youth 
Detention Center—when she was a teenager. 
She told me that one of the staff still in our 
employ raped her during her confinement. 
Our internal investigators and lawyers 
uncovered widespread sexual assault of 
female staff who often either quit or acceded 
to their supervisors’ pressure lest they find 
themselves alone and unaided in dangerous 
situations (Schiraldi 2015).
In 2010, by which time my colleagues 
and I had replaced Oak Hill with the smaller 
(although still too large and distant) New 
Beginnings Facility, I became Commissioner 
of New York City’s Probation Department, 
supervising around 2,500 youths and 
25,000 adults. Shortly before my arrival 
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Images (right): Fencing at 
Oak Hill Youth Detention 
Facility and Oak Hill Cell. 
Photos by David Yee 
and funded by the Public 
Welfare Foundation.
in New York, a teenage boy died in a state 
youth prison after being slammed to 
the ground and pounced on by facility staff 
in a harsh “takedown” (See Box 2: The New 
York Story). The Justice Department 
investigated and sued, reporting:
Staff…consistently used a high degree 
of force to gain control in nearly every 
type of situation… Anything from 
sneaking an extra cookie to initiating 
a fistfight may result in a full prone 
restraint with handcuffs. This one-
size-fits-all control approach has not 
surprisingly led to an alarming number 
of serious injuries to youth, including 
concussions, broken or knocked-out 
teeth, and spiral fractures (King 2009:5).
Within a few years of that report, New 
York City would remove all of its young 
people from youth prisons run by the 
State of New York.9
After my time in government, in 2017, I was 
plaintiff’s expert in a lawsuit against the 
Wisconsin Department of Corrections’ youth 
prisons—Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake. 
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In 2010, youth corrections in New York State was 
at a crisis point. The ACLU and Human Rights Watch 
had published a damning report about conditions 
for girls in state youth prisons run by the Office for 
Children and Family Services (OCFS) (Lewis 2006). 
That same year Darryl Thompson, a 15-year-old 
black boy from the Bronx, was killed during a lethal 
“takedown” by staff at the Tryon Residential Center, 
an OCFS youth prison in upstate New York. His death, 
which resulted in heighted scrutiny of OCFS youth 
prisons, was initially ruled a homicide by the county 
coroner but never prosecuted (Feldman 2007). 
The United States Justice Department investigated 
conditions at four OCFS facilities, filing and settling 
litigation with the state in December 2009. OCFS 
Commissioner Gladys Carrión described conditions 
in her facilities as “toxic” (Dwoskin 2010) and a state 
commission investigating conditions in the state’s 
youth prisons wrote:
New York’s juvenile justice system is failing 
in its mission to nurture and care for young 
people in state custody. The state’s punitive, 
correctional approach has damaged the future 
prospects of these young people, wasted 
millions of taxpayer dollars, and violated 
the fundamental principles of positive youth 
development (Task Force on Transforming 
Juvenile Justice 2009:8).
To be sure, the number of youths from New York City 
imprisoned in OCFS facilities had already dropped 
dramatically before then, falling from 1,896 in 1995 
to 642 by 2010 (New York State Office of Children 
and Family Services 2010:9; New York State Division 
for Youth 1996:6). But as the number of youths 
sent to OCFS facilities by judges throughout the 
state declined, the cost per youth mushroomed 
as state policymakers had been loath to close 
facilities that were shoring up rural economies 
(Bernstein 2014:481).
Shortly after his election in November 2010, Governor 
Andrew Cuomo toured Tryon, which was fully staffed 
yet completely devoid of young people. In his first 
State-of-the-State Address in January 2011, 
Governor Cuomo angrily summarized the case 
against the state’s youth prisons:
You have juvenile justice facilities today where 
we have young people who are incarcerated 
in these state programs who are receiving… 
treatment that has already been proven 
to be ineffective; recidivism rates in the 
90 percentile. The cost to the taxpayer is 
exorbitant. For one child, over $200,000 per 
year. The reason we continue to keep these 
children in these programs that aren’t serving 
them but are bilking the taxpayers is that we 
don’t want to lose the state jobs that we would 
lose if we closed the facilities. I understand, 
I understand, the importance of keeping jobs… 
I also understand that that does not justify the 
burden on the taxpayer and the violation of civil 
rights of the young person who is in a program 
that they don’t need where they’re not being 
treated, hundreds of miles from their home just 
to save state jobs. An incarceration program 
is not an employment program  (New York State 
Office of Governor Andrew Cuomo 2011b).
Likewise, Mayor Michael Bloomberg called the state’s 
youth prisons “relics of a bygone era, when troubled 
city kids were stripped from their families and 
shipped to detention centers in remote rural areas” 
(New York City Office of the Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
2010). Bloomberg proposed the “Close to Home” 
initiative through which all New York City youth 
would be returned to the city (or never sent away 
from home in the first place) and most of the money 
the state once spent to incarcerate them —up to 
$41.4 million—would follow the youth back home. 
The funds would be used to purchase an array of 
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in-home and community programs for the youth. 
The few youths placed out of home would be in small, 
homelike facilities near their home communities.
Sixteen months later, in April 2012, Close to 
Home (C2H) was enacted into law with support 
from Governor Cuomo, Mayor Bloomberg, and 
the state’s politically divided legislature. Youth 
began to be placed in facilities run by non-profit 
organizations in or near the city only five months 
after the bill’s passage.
Four years after C2H was enacted, outcomes 
were strongly favorable. The nation’s largest city 
had removed all of its youth sentenced through 
its family courts from deplorable state youth 
prisons. By February 2019, the number of youths in 
custody declined to 107 youth, now housed in local 
placements ranging in size from six to 20 beds. Only 
12 of those youth were held in locked facilities.9
Overall, there was a 68 percent decline in youth 
in placement in New York City from 2012 to 2016, 
compared to a 20 percent decline in the rest of 
the state (which was not affected by C2H during 
that time. Further, youth arrests in New York City 
dropped by 53 percent from 2012 to 2016, dwarfing 
the previous four years (-24 percent) and the 
41 percent decline in the rest of the state during 
that period. Ninety-one percent of C2H youth 
passed their academic classes while in custody 
in the 2016–17 academic year. Eighty-two percent 
of youth released from C2H facilities transitioned 
to a parent or guardian and 91 percent of youth 
exiting C2H facilities were enrolled in post-release 
community programming (Weissman et al. 2019).
The nation’s largest city—larger than most states—
showed it could simultaneously remove all of the 
youth prosecuted in its family courts from youth 
prisons, reinvest most of the savings into community 




Image (above): Brooklyn, New York limited secure 
Close to Home facility. Courtesy of Allison Dikanovic 
and Milwaukee Neighborhood News Service.
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One out of five youth incarcerated there 
were held in inhumane solitary confinement 
conditions, generally spending 23 hours 
a day in their cells. When outside their cell, 
they were cuffed hand and foot and often 
chained to fixed objects like tables in the day 
room where they sat in forced silence. They 
showered in a phone-booth sized cage and 
recreation was in an empty cell, alone, with 
a yoga ball. In granting a restraining order 
against the department’s practices, United 
States District Court Judge James Peterson, 
who had visited the federal “supermax” 
prison in Colorado, found that “(Unabomber) 
Ted Kaczynski has less restrictive 
confinement than the youth at Lincoln Hills” 
(J.J. v. Litscher 2017; Hovorka 2017).
In my 40 years as a juvenile facility 
staff member, foster parent, researcher, 
advocate, and department-head, it 
has always struck me that the general 
public experiences such atrocities as 
episodic, rather than endemic. This leads 
to investigations and critiques of this 
or that staff member, superintendent, 
administrator, Mayor, or Governor. But, until 
recently, there have not been widespread 
calls for a system-wide, critical examination 
and elimination of the youth prison model.
This, despite the fact that shortly after 
youth prisons sprang up in the U.S. 
in the 1800s, they were riddled with 
the same deplorable conditions that 
plague them to this day. Historian David 
Rothman chronicles the record of youth 
“reformatories” and “training schools” 
from their birth in the U.S. context 
during the 1800s. Rothman describes 
Images of Living Conditions 
for youth in solitary 
confinement at Lincoln Hills 
and Copper Lake. Photos 
taken by Vincent Schiraldi.
CAN WE ELIMINATE THE YOUTH PRISON? (AND WHAT SHOULD WE REPLACE IT WITH?)28
EXECUTIVE SESSION ON THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE POLICY
the newly-minted 19th century youth prisons 
as riddled from the onset with atrocities 
like leasing youth out under harsh labor 
conditions and physical abuse and neglect 
(2002). Summarizing this legacy, Rothman 
concludes, “when custody meets care, 
custody always wins” (Newsweek Staff 1994).
When he was head of youth corrections 
in Massachusetts in the early 1970s, 
Jerome Miller famously closed all of 
the Commonwealth’s youth prisons over 
a two-year period. As he placed youth into 
ultimately more successful community 
programs, he was met with fierce resistance 
from staff and elected officials defending 
a brutal status quo (Coates, Miller, and Ohlin 
1979; Krisberg and Austin 1998). Miller wrote 
the following of his view on the potential for 
youth prisons to improve:
Reformers come and reformers go. 
State institutions carry on. Nothing 
in their history suggests they can 
sustain reform, no matter what money, 
what staff, and programs are pumped 
into them. The same crises that have 
plagued them for 150 years intrude 
today. Though the cast may change, 
the players go on producing failure 
(Miller 1991:18).
The data bear out Miller and Rothman’s 
dismal conclusions. The Associated Press 
surveyed every juvenile justice agency 
incarcerating youth in the country from 
2004 to 2007, uncovering 13,000 allegations 
of abuse in facilities housing 46,000 youth 
(Mohr 2008). A 2018 survey by the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics found that 1 out of 
14 incarcerated youth reported being 
sexually assaulted while in custody in the 
12 months prior to the survey (Smith and 
Stroop 2019:1).
The Annie E. Casey Foundation issued 
a pair of reports analyzing litigation and 
media exposés on conditions in youth 
facilities from 1970 to 2015. Their 2011 
report uncovered evidence of systemic 
maltreatment in facilities in almost all 
states, half of which had occurred since 
2000 (Mendel 2011:5). This included 
high rates of violence, sexual abuse, 
overreliance on physical restraints, and 
excessive use of isolation and solitary 
confinement. Casey’s 2015 update found 
systemic maltreatment in an additional 
seven states, with seven states from 
the original cohort exhibiting ongoing 
evidence of constitutional violations 
(Mendel 2015:2–3). Often these violations 
occurred despite the fact that many of those 
states were under court oversight, like the 
one I inherited in Washington, DC. The data 
are overwhelming: these negative conditions 
are not facility-specific but characteristic 
of the youth prison model itself.
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High costs. Disappointing outcomes. 
Stark racial disparities. Abusive conditions. 
Successful programmatic and systemic 
examples of decarceration.
Above are a few of the reasons why youth 
prisons have increasingly fallen out of public 
favor and into disuse. These, and a blend 
of other factors that I will discuss more 
below, have contributed to a broad and steep 
decline in youth incarceration in the United 
States over the past two decades.
First, the substantial drop in youth 
arrests over the past several decades has 
significantly contributed to the decline in 
youth incarceration in at least two ways. 
Most obviously, the crime drop has reduced 
the number of young people available for 
the system to incarcerate. Moreover, the 
reversal of the spike in crime in the early 
90s to a two-decade decline has provided 
judges and elected officials with political 
breathing room to experiment with fewer 
youth prisons.
Some argue that the decline in youth arrests 
may, in and of itself, be sufficient to explain 
the drop in youth incarceration (Butts 2013). 
But that conclusion fails to answer the 
question of why some jurisdictions have 
experienced youth incarceration declines 
that far outstrip their youth crime declines. 
Or why adult incarceration has risen since 
2000 even while adult crime has declined.
Crime rates are hardly a reliable predictor 
of incarceration rates, and vice versa. 
Indeed, over the past four decades during 
which the United States has experimented 
with mass incarceration, there has been 
only a weak connection between crime and 
incarceration, suggesting that there is more 
to the youth incarceration drop than simply 
a youth crime drop. (National Research 
Council 2014).
There are several other factors that have 
also likely contributed to the decline 
in youth incarceration since 2000. 
Increasingly sophisticated and well-funded 
advocates and community organizers 
have launched local and national efforts to 
close youth prisons and stop incarcerating 
youth in adult prisons or trying them as 
adults (Ryan and Schindler 2011).10 For 
example, the Youth First Initiative, which 
describes itself as a “national campaign 
to end youth incarceration and invest in 
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community-based supports, services and 
opportunities for youth,” now has campaigns 
to eliminate youth prisons with local youth, 
families and grass roots organizers in nine 
states (Youth First Initiative 2019b). Their 
goal is to amass enough deinstitutionalized 
states to get the nation’s system over 
a “tipping point” to total elimination of the 
youth prison model. Importantly, their 
efforts to craft justice solutions that eschew 
reliance on youth prisons involve not only 
community members and families, but also 
the voices of youth in the system (Youth 
First Initiative 2019c).
Even before Youth First, some early 
youth justice activists, philanthropists 
and youth correctional administrators 
recognized the importance of including 
youth and family voices in order to 
achieve meaningful youth justice policy 
forums. For example, for decades, youth 
in Missouri routinely testified at annual 
Division of Youth Services hearings (Mendel 
2010). In 2003, Friends and Families of 
Louisiana’s Incarcerated Children (FFLIC) 
helped successfully lead the charge 
to close the state’s notorious Tallulah 
Correctional Center for Youth (Marguerite 
Casey Foundation 2015). In 2015, the 
Annie E. Casey Foundation created a youth 
advisory council to inform their juvenile 
justice work (The Annie E. Casey Foundation 
2015). Furthermore, these examples 
all include positive youth development 
efforts; by participating in advocacy, 
system-impacted youth are able to use their 
own knowledge and strengths to develop 
individual agency (Butts, Bazemore, and 
Saa Meroe 2010).
In addition to helping young people develop, 
these partnerships humanized youth in 
ways that, in my view, came to prominence 
later for criminal justice reformers.11 
Now, as criminal justice reform efforts 
are increasingly spearheaded by formerly 
incarcerated people– from closing Rikers 
Island in New York City, to reinstating the 
vote for people with felony records in Florida, 
to ending non-unanimous jury verdicts 
in Louisiana—they are carried out with 
a greater sense of urgency and are notching 
significant wins (JustLeadership USA 2020; 
Katal Center for Health, Equity and Justice 
2018; Norwood 2020; O’Donoghue 2018).
Efforts to replace youth prisons are 
sometimes successfully joined by litigators 
from organizations like the Juvenile Law 
Center, the National Center for Youth Law, 
the Youth Law Center, the Southern Poverty 
Law Center and the ACLU, among others. 
While the specific legal emphasis of litigation 
is on improving conditions, such litigation 
often highlights institutional atrocities, 
increases the costs of running minimally 
constitutional facilities, and creates 
flashpoints for reform.
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Philanthropic support has also helped 
focus specifically and over a long-term 
on reducing youth incarceration and 
creating a developmentally appropriate 
response to youth crime that eschews 
youth prisons. The Annie E. Casey 
Foundation’s Juvenile Detention 
Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) provides 
a prime example of how philanthropic 
commitments to youth justice reform have 
affected the field. JDAI was founded in 
1994, at the height of the super-predator 
era, to help jurisdictions safely and 
effectively reduce pre-adjudication 
youth detention populations and racial 
disparities in detention. Launching in five 
demonstration sites, JDAI is now in 40 
states, three tribes, and over 300 counties. 
The Casey Foundation has also expanded 
to reduce post-adjudication placements 
in 12 jurisdictions across seven states 
and reform youth probation in 14 sites 
across eight states.12 Research by the 
Earl Warren at the Institute on Law and 
Policy at the University of California at 
Berkeley found that within 23 states 
where JDAI was operating prior to 
2010, detention populations had fallen 
2.5 times more in participating counties 
(down 42 percent) than in the states as 
a whole (down 17 percent) (Chief Justice 
Earl Warren 2012:5). Through this long-term 
and growing commitment, the Casey 
Foundation has helped states and counties 
accrue experience with, and evidence 
about, safely reducing youth detention 
for decades and throughout the country 
(The Annie E. Casey Foundation 2020b).
The MacArthur Foundation’s Research 
Network on Adolescent Development and 
Juvenile Justice highlighted the need for 
developmentally appropriate approaches 
to youth justice. This research has had 
a profound impact on several United 
States Supreme Court decisions about 
the juvenile death penalty and juvenile 
life without parole, and has influenced the 
discussion of broader youth justice reforms 
system-wide. (McCarthy et al. 2015; The 
MacArthur Foundation 2020). More recently, 
the Youth First State Advocacy Fund was 
established as a funding collaborative 
aiming to close youth prisons and secure 
investment in communities most impacted 
by incarceration, working in partnership 
with the Youth First Initiative and grass 
roots groups throughout the country 
(Art for Justice Fund 2018).
DURING THE FIVE YEARS I RAN WASHINGTON,  
DC’S DYRS, I DID NOT HAVE A SINGLE WHITE  
KID COMMITTED TO MY DEPARTMENT’S CUSTODY.
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These initiatives often partnered with, 
influenced, and were influenced by 
a burgeoning assemblage of reform-minded 
youth correctional leaders. For example, 
in 2019 a group of 57 youth correctional 
administrators joined calls by advocates, 
youth, and families to end the youth prison 
model and replace it with a youth justice 
system favoring community programs and 
small, local facilities for the incarcerated few 
(Gressier 2019).13 The newly-formed Youth 
Correctional Leaders for Justice states that:
As current and former leaders of youth 
justice agencies around the country, 
we believe that the time has come 
to close down youth prisons, once 
and for all. Our collective experience 
“on the inside” has shown us that 
separating youth from their families 
and communities and emphasizing 
punishment and retribution harms 
young people and their communities 
(Youth Correctional Leaders for 
Justice 2019).
Finally, a growing cadre of “evidence-based 
practices” (EBPs) that were subject to 
randomized clinical trials, like Multi-systemic 
Therapy, Functional Family Therapy, and 
Multi-Dimensional Treatment Foster Care, 
were shown to reduce recidivism when 
applied to populations of young people 
similar in risk and offending to those 
who were being incarcerated. This offered 
cost-conscious policymakers concerned 
with public safety research-backed 
alternatives to youth imprisonment at 
lower costs (Washington State Institute 
for Public Policy 2019).
This stew of reform elements has worked 
not only to push down incarceration, but 
to shift public opinion in the direction 
of a less punitive and more supportive 
youth justice system. A recent survey 
of 1,000 respondents conducted by 
GBAO Strategies found that 80 percent 
supported providing financial incentives 
to reduce youth incarceration in favor 
of community rehabilitative programs; 
70 percent supported reducing racial 
and ethnic disparities in the youth justice 
system; and 57 percent supported closing 
youth prisons (GBAO Strategies 2019:1–2). 
Poll findings of this sort were unheard of 
in the heyday of the super-predator era.
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IMPLICATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
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The youth justice system has already 
travelled to a place where many leading 
criminal justice advocates hope to be 
soon: half as much incarceration; a major 
shift away from the use of larger youth 
prisons; far fewer collateral consequences; 
some funding of community programs and 
rehabilitation; field leaders openly calling 
for the demise of the youth prison; growing 
public support for closing youth prisons; and 
several states and large jurisdictions safely 
eschewing high-capacity, locked facilities, 
or vowing to do so. 
While advocates and community organizers 
rightly argue that much more needs to 
be done, with campaigns to close youth 
prisons growing more common and 
20 years of plunging youth incarceration 
under our belts, now seems like a good 
time to take stock of where we are with 
youth confinement, where we should be 
headed, and what lessons there are for 
adult decarceration.
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IMPLICATION #1—WE SHOULD  
FINISH THE JOB
The first and most obvious implication of 
these data is that we should finish the job 
of ending America’s 180-year experiment 
with youth imprisonment. Consistently 
brutal conditions, stark racial disparities, 
dismal outcomes, and high costs have 
characterized youth prisons since their 
birth. Jurisdictions reducing or eliminating 
youth prisons have already done so without 
jeopardizing public safety, funneling some 
of the savings from deinstitutionalization 
into programs to support youth who would 
otherwise have been incarcerated. And there 
is public support for doing so.
Often, youth prisons provide jobs in the rural 
communities in which they are generally 
located, rendering them difficult to close 
due to entrenched interests among staff 
or local elected officials or business 
leaders. As such, public officials in charge 
of closures can come under harsh public 
scrutiny (Bernstein 2014; Miller 1991). Gladys 
Carrión, who closed two dozen youth prisons 
when she headed youth corrections in New 
York, was vilified by her staff and elected 
leaders in the upstate communities where 
those facilities were located, in spite of the 
facilities’ deplorable conditions, stark racial 
disparities, and underutilization (Bernstein 
2014). Similarly, Jerome Miller’s memoir 
Last One Over the Wall describes the fierce 
resistance and sabotage he endured closing 
Massachusetts’ training schools (1991). When 
I closed the Oak Hill Youth Center, I was the 
subject of numerous votes of no confidence 
by the Fraternal Order of the Police, the 
union representing my staff—some of 
whose members were actively involved 
in sabotaging our efforts (Schiraldi 2010).
This resistance renders youth facilities 
difficult to close, not because they are 
achieving the rehabilitative or public safety 
goals for which they were established, 
but because they feather a variety of 
well-connected nests. In New York, for 
example, state officials were required to 
announce any correctional facility’s closure 
a year prior to actually closing it, due to 
legislation passed during the administration 
of Governor George Pataki at the urging of 
the correctional officers’ unions and elected 
officials from rural “prison towns” (New York 
Public Law 2011). Once a prison closure 
is announced, this provision allows local 
business, political leaders, and correctional 
officers to organize in protest against 
shuttering local youth prisons.
As a result, facility costs per incarcerated 
youth often mushroom as such facilities 
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outlive their utility but cling to their existence 
(Tucker and Palomino 2019). In both California 
and New York, as incarcerated youth 
populations plummeted, cost per confined 
youth reached a quarter million dollars a year 
(Schiraldi et al. 2011:426; Weissman, et al. 
2019:10–11). In the year prior to the closure 
of the Connecticut Juvenile Training School, 
43 youth were incarcerated in it, at a total 
cost of $53 million (Kovner 2016). In 2014, 
the Justice Policy Institute found that 
deep-end institutional confinement of youth 
costs an average of over $150,000 annually 
and 33 states had average confinement 
costs of over $100,000 per youth per year 
in confinement (Petteruti, Schindler, and 
Ziedenberg 2014:12).
There are lessons here for both youth and 
adult justice. In youth justice, policymakers, 
advocates and community organizers in 
states with waning incarcerated youth 
populations should look to complete facility 
closures, rather than partially downsize. 
Shrunken prisons consume almost as 
many resources as full ones do, given the 
many fixed costs required to operate them 
and the reluctance of elected officials 
to lay off workers who are often their 
constituents. For those looking to decrease 
mass incarceration for adults, wresting 
the resources away from the facilities 
will be a considerable challenge that needs  
to be taken head on.
Techniques to repurpose facilities that 
include affected communities in the 
design process will be vital to shore 
up local economies and may help quell 
objections to facility closures. Early in 
his administration, New York Governor 
Andrew Cuomo allocated $50 million and 
additional tax credits to spur economic 
development in communities where youth 
or adult prisons have closed (New York 
State Office of Governor Andrew Cuomo 
2011a). When I closed DC’s Oak Hill Youth 
Correctional Center, the District was 
reluctant to allocate funds to raze it, so we 
did the next best thing. Working with City 
Administrator Dan Tangherlini, the District 
leased the facility to the National Guard, 
which has rehabbed it, removed much of the 
correctional apparatus and feel, and turned 
it into the DC Youth ChalleNGe residential 
program for at risk youth (District of 
Columbia National Guard N.d.)
Because so many youth prisons have closed, 
researchers and advocates have begun to 
document examples that could point the way 
for organizers, advocates and public officials 
as they look to close adult correctional 
facilities (Harvell, Warnberg, Sakala, and 
Hull 2019; Youth First Initiative 2019a). It 
bears remembering that, as prisons begin 
to close, it will take more effort to finish the 
job than just turning off the lights as the last 
person leaves.
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IMPLICATION #2—CAPTURE 
AND REDEPLOY RESOURCES
A key reason to focus on closing youth 
prisons is to redeploy the exorbitant 
resources poured into them to bolster 
community cohesion and supports for those 
coming home. This investment can help build 
a more durable, “thicker” brand of community 
safety to replace the “thin” kind that reliance 
on imprisonment provides (Western 2018).
In the last two decades, youth justice 
systems nationwide have begun to move 
in this direction, as a growing number 
of places are shifting resources out of 
incarceration and into communities. For 
example, efforts like New York City’s Close 
to Home initiative, RECLAIM Ohio, Redeploy 
Illinois, and fiscal realignment in California, 
Connecticut, Kansas, Texas, and Virginia, 
to name a few, have reallocated hundreds 
of millions of dollars from youth prisons to 
counties and communities while reducing 
incarcerated populations and closing youth 
prisons (Schiraldi et al. 2011; Schoenberg, 
Pheiffer, and Rosenthal 2019; Virginia 
Association of Counties 2018; Kovner 2018). 
While such approaches are rarely subject 
to sophisticated evaluations (like youth 
imprisonment itself), they have coincided 
with sustained reductions in youth crime 
and incarceration (McCarthy et al. 2015:19).
These approaches have been more 
successful than similar efforts to reallocate 
funds from adult prisons to community 
programs. Perhaps this is because youth 
justice systems were more used to 
contracting with non-profit organizations 
to provide at least some modicum of 
rehabilitative programming while adult 
prison systems largely abandoned 
rehabilitation starting in the 1970s 
(National Research Council 2014; McCarthy 
et al. 2016; Austin, Clear, Duster, Greenberg, 
Irwin, McCoy, Mobley, Owen, and Page 2007). 
Put another way, realigning resources 
from youth prisons may be easier than 
from adult prisons because adult prisons 
have a longer way to go.
While cause and effect are difficult to 
establish (Butts 2013; Balis and Woods 
2013), it is undeniable that, in many states—
those mentioned above and others—as youth 
incarceration has declined, funds have 
sometimes been funneled into community 
programs and/or probation services and 
youth crime has dropped considerably. 
It is also clear that the declines in youth 
incarceration have been more in-line with 
youth crime drops than the separate paths 
adult crime and incarceration have taken 
(See Figure 1).
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This suggests that policy changes, 
including reinvestment of savings into 
supports for youth in lieu of confinement, 
are an important factor in the dramatic 
reductions in youth imprisonment.
By contrast, the leading approach 
to reinvesting dollars from prisons 
to communities—the federal Justice 
Reinvestment Initiative—has been 
criticized for overstating its prison 
reduction outcomes and failing to 
reinvest substantially in communities 
(Austin, Cadora, Clear, Dansky, Greene, 
Gupta, Mauer, Porter, Tucker, and 
Young 2013). If a substantial portion 
of the 2.2 million people in America’s 
prisons and jails are to be returned 
successfully to their home neighborhoods, 
advocates, organizers and policymakers 
will need to craft policy that does better 
than pay lip service to reinvestment 




A lament heard often among youth 
corrections workers (sometimes with 
a tinge of resentment projected onto youths’ 
families and communities) is that some youth 
do well when they are in custody, but then 
reoffend when they return home, even if they 
are referred to aftercare services. Still, little 
is done in either the criminal or youth justice 
system to work directly with highly impacted 
communities to improve the environment 
to which youth and adults will return upon 
release from incarceration (or stay in instead 
of being locked up). Even with youth justice’s 
better reinvestment record in funding 
community programs, much more needs to 
be done to move beyond group homes and 
even individually-focused evidence based 
practices to build legitimacy in our justice 
systems and support community cohesion— 
both of which have been shown to reduce 
crime rates (National Research Council 2013; 
Sharkey 2018).
As evident in the collective action literature, 
communities are much more likely to 
advance their own safety and well-being 
when they have neighborhood-based and 
resident-led institutions that support 
basic needs and exert informal social 
control (Gamson 1991; Sampson, McAdam, 
MacIndoe, and Weffer-Elizondo 2005; 
Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997). 
For example, every 10 additional non-profit 
organizations devoted to community 
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development or violence prevention in a city 
with 100,000 residents led to a 9 percent 
drop in the murder rate and a 6 percent drop 
in violent crime (Sharkey, Torrats-Espinosa, 
and Takyar 2017).
Here and abroad, worthwhile experiments 
have been launched in both adult and youth 
justice that tap into the expertise of formerly 
incarcerated people, family members, and 
communities—often led by people of color 
who are overrepresented in incarceration—
to co-design services and supports that 
help minimize the need to incarcerate 
while improving safety. The Public Welfare 
Foundation (PWF) has launched a video 
series on programs and supports that 
have “bubbled up” from communities 
that they anticipate can help end youth 
incarceration (Public Welfare Foundation 
2019).14 Candice Jones, PWF President 
and former Commissioner of the Illinois 
Department of Juvenile Justice, has stated:
When reinvestment is at its best, it’s 
about reinvesting out of systems and 
into communities and the places that 
are being the most harmed. It is our 
hope at the Public Welfare Foundation 
that, by sharing these stories, it 
inspires other jurisdictions to see that 
transformative, community-based 
approaches to justice are not only 
possible, but are working.15
The Urban Institute has launched 
a project to investigate which approaches 
jurisdictions are, or should be, using to 
invest in communities and divest in youth 
prisons, aimed at answering the question 
“How can we support better outcomes 
for youth and families by investing more 
resources in programming and community 
development strategies in neighborhoods 
disproportionately impacted by 
incarceration?” (Harvell et al. 2019).
In order to move beyond mass incarceration, 
both adult and youth justice organizers 
and policymakers will need to find a way 
to transfer power and resources to the 
communities most affected by crime and 
incarceration in order to replace mass 
incarceration with community cohesion.
This will include tapping into the power 
of formerly incarcerated “credible 
messengers” like those in New York City, 
Oakland, California, and Washington, D.C 
(Credible Messenger Justice Center 2020; 
Department of Youth Rehabilitation 
Services N.d.). For example, the Arches 
Mentoring program, adapted from Oakland’s 
Mentoring Center, pairs credible messengers 
with high risk young adults (ages 18–24) on 
New York City probation. Arches participants 
work with credible messengers, most of 
whom have been formerly incarcerated, 
in a transformative mentoring model 
that pairs elements of group mentorship, 
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cognitive behavioral therapy, and journaling. 
Research by the Urban Institute has found 
that Arches participants had 57 percent 
lower felony reconviction rates within 
their first two years of probation than 
other, similar probation youth who were 
in neighborhoods where Arches was 
not offered  (Lynch, Esthappan, Astone, 
Collazos, and Lipman 2018:42; Alcorn 2019).
Communities can also be enlisted to 
directly help with housing their families 
and neighbors reentering from prison. 
Returning people often have a difficult 
time finding decent housing options upon 
release, sometimes delaying their parole 
or forcing them into substandard options. 
Family members are often willing to assist 
but unable to do so (Western 2018). The 
Osborne Association’s Kinship Reentry 
Program and Impact Justice’s Homecoming 
Project offer two examples of more personal, 
individualized, and community-centered 
housing options than oft-criticized halfway 
houses (Gilna 2015). Like Kinship Care in 
the child welfare context, Kinship Reentry 
is designed to financially support family 
members to successfully receive their loved 
ones coming home from prison instead of 
having them placed into halfway houses 
or homeless shelters (New York Office of 
the District Attorney Cyrus R. Vance 2018). 
The Homecoming Project taps into the 
resource that many “empty-nester” families 
in neighborhoods heavily impacted by 
imprisonment present. The project provides 
subsidies to homeowners to house returning 
citizens in spare bedrooms in an “AirBNB-
style” arrangement, coupled with additional 
social services and supports (Impact 
Justice 2020).
Communities can also undertake some 
justice system functions that are normally 
performed by government. In Baltimore, 
when the W. Haywood Burns Institute 
launched a call-notification project— 
originally staffed by a mother whose child 
had been in detention—to remind families 
of court appearances, detention for failures 
to appear in court dropped by 75 percent 
(W. Haywood Burns Institute 2006).
Similarly, members of the Nga Puhi 
Iwi (“tribe”) in Northern New Zealand 
were troubled because, when their children 
were arrested, they would be detained 
three to seven hours from home, depending 
on available detention space. The tribe 
took action, creating an “invisible remand” 
program. Tribal families agreed to hold 
youth in their homes in lieu of shipping 
them off to detention. Members of the 
tribe were also hired to supervise and 
engage the youth in cultural activities 
during the day (Schiraldi 2019).
Several pilots have been launched or are 
launching for community members and 
government to co-design community 
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reinvestment approaches. In 2014, after 
a spike in shootings in New York City’s Public 
Housing developments, the Mayor’s Office 
of Criminal Justice organized twelve city 
agencies—including police, housing, mental 
health, education, probation, and community 
development—to work with community 
residents to co-design neighborhood-based 
efforts to increase public safety, dubbed the 
Mayor’s Action Plan (MAP). These included 
hiring formerly incarcerated people to 
mentor neighborhood kids, expanding 
the summer youth employment program, 
and extending community centers’ hours 
until midnight. Violent crime declined 
by 8.9 percent in the 15 MAP housing 
developments in the effort’s first four years, 
compared to a 5.1 percent decline in crime 
in New York City’s housing developments 
that are not part of MAP (Trone 2019:5).
In 2017, the Colorado Criminal Justice 
Reform Coalition partnered with legislators 
from both parties to craft a new approach 
to justice reinvestment. The resultant 
Justice Reinvestment Crime Prevention 
Bill reinvested $4 million annually in two 
communities—North Aurora and Southeast 
Colorado Springs, Colorado—for an initial 
three-year pilot period.16 The bill funds 
a micro-loan program to spur small 
business development in the two pilot 
neighborhoods. Additionally, it funds 
a community grants program co-designed 
by Local Planning Teams in each 
neighborhood to set crime prevention 
funding priorities (Colorado Criminal Justice 
Reform Coalition 2020).
In 2019, the Brooklyn District Attorney 
and Center for Nu Leadership—a Brooklyn 
non-profit founded by formerly incarcerated 
people to organize youth and community to 
achieve Human Justice—joined forces with 
the Columbia Justice Lab to initiate planning 
of the Imagining Project. This summer the 
initiative will begin working closely with 
Brooklyn neighborhoods most impacted by 
the criminal justice system to co-design 
safety and justice projects. These projects 
will help zero out incarceration (or nearly do 
so) for youth ages 25 and under in Brooklyn, 
a borough (county) of 2.6 million people—
approximately the size of Chicago.
This roster of innovations is not meant 
to be a comprehensive list of evidence-
based options for policymakers and activists 
to airlift onto their jurisdictions. On the 
contrary, part of the strength of realigning 
resources and power to communities is the 
collaborative design process that involves 
communities in their own innovations. 
Instead of a cook book, these should 
be viewed as a “flavor bible”—or a set of 
ingredients that mesh well with one another 
but are deliberately not prescriptive. These 
ingredients include services, supports and 
opportunities that have bubbled up from 
communities, have involved residents 
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in their development and implementation, 
and are funded by monies that are shifted 
from corrections to communities. If youth 
and adult justice systems gravitate in this 
direction, they should carefully research 
and evaluate their innovative approaches, 
together with impacted communities, 
to learn and share lessons from 
their experiences.
IT BEARS REMEMBERING THAT, AS PRISONS  
BEGIN TO CLOSE, IT WILL TAKE MORE EFFORT 
TO FINISH THE JOB THAN JUST TURNING OFF 
THE LIGHTS AS THE LAST PERSON LEAVES.
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CONCLUSION
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During the 1990s, young people enmeshed 
in the juvenile justice system were vilified as 
public enemy number one. Vitriolic epithets 
stereotyped a generation as miscreants 
ready to engulf an unsuspecting public. 
This occurred even as youth crime had 
already begun what would become a several 
decade decline.
But that incarceration tide has turned, with 
youth incarceration dropping by more than 
half since its peak in 2000 alongside a 60 
percent decline in youth crime. In some 
places, like New York City and Washington, 
DC, youth incarceration for white youth has 
disappeared entirely and incarceration for 
youth of color has nearly done so, all without 
increasing youth crime, offering widespread 
hope for the elimination of the youth prison.
This evidence roundly refutes the very 
foundation of the waning super-predator era, 
under which mass incarceration purported 
to be a salve for crime. It also offers some 
hopeful, potential lessons for those eager 
to see the end of mass incarceration not 
just for young people, but for all people.
PART OF THE STRENGTH OF REALIGNING 
RESOURCES AND POWER TO COMMUNITIES  
IS THE COLLABORATIVE DESIGN PROCESS  
THAT INVOLVES COMMUNITIES IN THEIR  
OWN INNOVATIONS.
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ENDNOTES
1 This phrase was so unexceptional 
that laws making it easier to try kids 
as adults were commonly called 
“adult crime, adult time” statutes  
[www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/adult_time_for_adult_crimes].
2 NB: 2017 is the last year for which 
the federal government has published 
youth incarceration data.
3 Full source citations can be found 
in References.
4 From 2009 to 2017, U.S. incarceration 
totals have declined by 7.8%, while 
arrest rates (as a proxy for crime) 
have declined by 27%. See Editorial 
Board 2019; Federal Bureau of 
Investigation 2009; Federal Bureau 
of Investigation 2017a. 
5 Information obtained from personal 
correspondence between the author 
and Mark Mertens, Milwaukee County 
Department of Youth and Family 
Services Administrator.
6 Information obtained from 
personal correspondence between 
the author and Circuit Court Judge 
Laura A. Crivello.
7 Information obtained from personal 
correspondence between the author 
and Mark Mertens, Milwaukee County 
Department of Youth and Family 
Services Administrator.
8 Starting in 2017, the Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
(OJJDP) stopped including the race 
“Latino” as sampling criteria. Instead, 
survey data included the ethnicity 
“Hispanic” or “Non-Hispanic;” thus, after 
2015 Latino-white racial disparities 
cannot be determined.
9 Data obtained from personal 
correspondence between the 
author and Felipe Franco, Deputy 
Commissioner, Division of Youth 
and Family Justice, New York City 
Administration for Children’s Services.
10 See, for example, the Campaign 
for Youth Justice, Youth First and the 
National Juvenile Justice Network.
11 This, despite the best efforts of 
pioneers in fighting to get the voice 
of formerly incarcerated people 
into the public dialogue around 
prisons, including the Center for 
Nu Leadership’s Eddie Ellis and Legal 
Services for Prisoners with Children’s 
Dorsey Nunn, who helped pave the 
way for organizations like the Formerly 
Incarcerated, Convicted People and 
Families Movement.
12 Information obtained from personal 
correspondence between the author 
and Nathaniel Balis, Director of the 
Juvenile Justice Strategy Group, 
The Annie E. Casey Foundation.
13 Other efforts to elevate the voices 
of youth justice administrators in 
policy matters include the Council of 
Juvenile Justice Administrators and 
Georgetown University’s Center for 
Juvenile Justice Reform.
14 View videos at www.youtube.com/
channel/UCdbziFG_AhTEdAOBaCa-_sg.
15 Quote obtained through 
correspondence with Candice Jones’ 
administrative office at the Public 
Welfare Foundation.
16 In 2019, the Colorado Legislature 
extended the pilot for an additional 
three years until 2023.
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